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Abstract: In recent years, there has been growing public attention to a problem many US health institutions
and providers disclaim: bullying and coercion of pregnant women during birth by health care personnel,
known as obstetric violence. Through a series of real case studies, this article provides a legal practitioner’s
perspective on a systemic problem of institutionalized gender-based violence with only individual tort
litigation as an avenue for redress, and even that largely out of reach for women. It provides an overview of
the limitations of the civil justice system in addressing obstetric violence, and compares alternatives from
Latin American jurisdictions. Finally, the article posits policy solutions for the legal system and health care
systems.© 2016 Reproductive HealthMatters. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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In June 2014, a Florida obstetrician, Dr. Sarah
Digiorgi, declared to a television news interviewer
that there is no such thing as a forced caesarean sur-
gery.1 Asked to comment on an incident unfolding
at a nearby hospital, she told media, “If that woman
says, ‘No way, I refuse to have a C-section,’ then you
cannot take that person to the operating room.”
Despite Digiorgi’s insistence that no such thing was
possible, this was the exact threat being levelled against
Jennifer Goodall, amother of threewho hoped to deliver
her fourth child vaginally after three caesareans. In
her thirty-seventh week of pregnancy, Goodall had
received a letter from her obstetrician’s ofﬁce. The letter,
signed by thehospital’s chiefﬁnancial ofﬁcer, advised her
that the hospital planned to take the following actions:
“1. We will contact the Department of Children and
Family Services about your refusal to undergo a
Cesarean section and other care and treatment
recommended by your physicians and the high risks
your refusals have on your life and health, as well
as the life and health of your unborn child.
2. We will begin a process for an Expedited Judicial
Intervention Concerning Medical Treatment Proce-
dures. This is a proceeding for expedited judicial
intervention concerning medical treatment proce-
dures relating to the delivery of your child.
3. If you present to our hospital in labor, and your
physician deems it clinically necessary, a CesareanContents online: www.rhm-elsevier.com56section will be performed with or without your
consent.”
The letter claimed that the hospital’s ethics
committee had authorized these threats and
included a curious assessment of Goodall’s rights:
“While we recognize that you have the right to con-
sent to a Cesarean section, you have elected to
refuse this procedure despite the advice of your
treating physicians. This decision places both you
and your unborn child at risk for death or serious
injury. We will act in the best interests of you, your
family, and your unborn child.”
Seemingly, Goodall had a right to consent to the
surgery, but not a right to refuse it. And for its part,
the institution asserted a right to act in Goodall’s best
interest (as deﬁned by the hospital) as well as that of
her foetus and her family, even over her objection.
Finally, having threatened her custody of her children
by invoking child protective authorities, her right to
due process of law, and her bodily integrity, the hospital
urged her to “trust your physicians and our staff to do
the right thing for you, your unborn child, and family.”
What, then, of Digiorgi’s assurance that there is
no such thing as a forced caesarean? How is it
reconciled with the hospital’s claim – that it was
justiﬁed in performing surgery “with or without”
Goodall’s consent? In fact, each is only half-right,
and the truth is multi-layered: there is such a thingDoi: 10.1016/j.rhm.2016.04.004
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redressed by courts. Most importantly, forced sur-
gery is only the most egregious indicator in a larger
underlying pattern of disrespect and abuse toward
pregnant and birthing women by health care pro-
viders and medical institutions.
Any forced surgery is a violent act. But forced
caesarean surgery, that takes place in a setting
where women hold less power than doctors, in a
society where women’s capacity for pregnancy has
been historically used to sanction their exclusion
from full citizenship, is more than a simple battery.
It is a form of gender-based violence, increasingly
recognized around the world as obstetric violence.
Most importantly, as the case studies in this article
bear out, this obstetric violence is an infringement
of women’s human rights to non-discrimination,
liberty and security of the person, reproductive
health and autonomy, and freedom from cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment. Such an attack
on women’s human dignity requires a more robust
state response than access to civil courts – a remedy
that itself remains elusive.
This article takes the important step of acknow-
ledging that the problem of obstetric violence exists
in the United States – a proposition that, as Digior-
gi’s statement demonstrates, is not yet fully recog-
nized. It begins with a discussion of several case
studies from recent years (which are a key form of
data to a precedent-based, or “common law”, legal
system such as that of the United States), which illus-
trate the nature of the problem. It then provides an
overview of legal recognition in US courts, exposing
the limitations of tort litigation as an avenue for
addressing a systemic problem and providing a
comparison to avenues of legal redress from other
jurisdictions. Finally, it recommends some potential
solutions to more fully address the root causes of
obstetric violence.†Recent case studies
What follows is only a small sample of the numer-
ous cases of obstetric violence, representing various
levels of threat and actual violence, that have been
documented or pursued by National Advocates for
Pregnant Women and other maternity care advo-
cacy organizations within the past several years.* It
is difﬁcult to get a sense of how prevalent the pro-
blem is from case reports alone; however, the⁎Individual cases have been shared with permission.existing US research suggests that women experi-
ence signiﬁcant pressure and loss of autonomy in
maternity care. Roth et al2 surveyed birth workers
(including doulas, childbirth educators, and labour
and delivery nurses) and found that more than half
had witnessed a physician engage in a procedure
explicitly against a woman’s will, and nearly two-
thirds had witnessed providers “occasionally” or
“often” engage in procedures without giving a
woman a choice or time to consider the procedure.
The Listening to Mothers III survey by Declercq et al3
found that as many as a quarter of new mothers
who had induced labours or caesarean deliveries
felt pressure to do so, and 63% of women who had
a primary caesarean identiﬁed their doctor as the
“decision maker”.† During the #BreaktheSilence
social media campaign led by consumer advocate
group Improving Birth, hundreds of women shared
their experiences of bullying, coercion, and even
unconsented procedures such as episiotomies and
vaginal examinations during birth.4
While the incidents captured in legal and media
reports are few in number compared to the
approximately 4,000,000 births that take place in
the US each year, their signiﬁcance to the indivi-
duals who experienced the violation, and to the
health systems in which they occur, is profound.
And in a common law jurisdiction like the US,
even a single story has the power to shape the law.
Unconsented surgery
Rinat Dray is an Orthodox Jewish woman from the
Crown Heights area of Brooklyn, New York.5,6 In
her religion, children are a blessing, and families
welcome as many as possible. She delivered her ﬁrst
two children by caesarean surgery. The surgeries
had been emotionally difﬁcult for her and she had
postoperative pain for many months; she also knew
that having more surgeries would lead to greater
risk to her health and fertility.7 Dray was therefore
highly motivated to have a vaginal birth after cae-
sarean (VBAC) for her third delivery.
When she became pregnant in 2010, she
researched medical recommendations, including
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists’ (ACOG) 2010 Practice Bulletin on VBAC,8
which says that VBAC after two surgeries can be a
safe option for some women. Dray made use ofThat said, 83% of women in the same survey reported positive
regard (either “good” or “excellent”) for the US maternity care
system.
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consumer advocacy and support groups, doula
care, and a state-wide Maternity Information Act9
that requires all hospitals to disclose their caesar-
ean and VBAC rates) to ﬁnd a practice where she
was most likely to achieve a VBAC.‡ She settled
on a hospital in Staten Island, which would
require her to travel a signiﬁcant distance over a
notoriously high-trafﬁc bridge while in labour,
because it boasts one of the lowest caesarean rates
and highest rate of VBAC success in the city’s
dozens of hospitals with maternity services.
When she arrived at the hospital in labour, the
doctor present was not the one who had supported
her planned VBAC throughout her pregnancy.6 This
doctor urged her toward a caesarean, telling her
“You had two before, why not have another one?”
As the hours passed and her labour progressed
slowly, the doctor became increasingly insistent
that she have surgery, but offered no clinical justi-
ﬁcation for the urgency. She considered going back
home to labour, but was told that if she left she
should not come back, and that she could not
transfer care to another facility because “nobody
would take you”. When she asked for more time
to labour, the doctor told her that he would get a
court order against her to force surgery, and that
the state would take her baby because she would
not agree to surgery. According to legal documents
ﬁled by Dray, the doctor told her, “My license is
more important than you.”
The obstetrician brought in a maternal-foetal
medicine specialist who also urged Dray to have
surgery, but neither physician cited an emergency
to warrant it. Unknown to Dray, the physicians had
consulted several times about getting a court order
to force her into surgery. And although these
events transpired over the course of a Monday
morning and afternoon when courts were open,
no court order was sought. Instead, the surgery
was approved by hospital counsel, with the record
by the specialist noting “the patient has capacity
[to make her own medical decisions]. I have
decided to override her refusal to have a c-section.”
As she was wheeled to surgery, Dray begged not to
be operated on. The doctor just told her, “Don’t
speak”. Dray was seriously injured during the surgery,
suffering a bladder transection that causes her pain‡These resources are, of course, predicated on language and
health literacy, access to information, and in the case of doula
care, signiﬁcant ﬁnancial means.
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the physicians and hospital, and her case is currently
pending appeal, the trial court having rejected her
argument and that of amici curiae (friend of the
court) interveners that pregnant patients have a right
to refuse any unwanted medical care on equal foot-
ing with other patients.6
Threats of arrest
At one week past her due date with her ﬁfth child,
Lisa Epsteen went to her ob/gyn clinic for an ultra-
sound.10 Having undergone four previous caesar-
eans, the Tampa Bay, Florida mother was excited
to have found a physician who would support her
in attempting a trial of labour for the ﬁfth birth. As
her due date passed, however, Epsteen readied
herself for the possibility of a repeat surgery, even
agreeing to schedule the surgery because of health
factors including gestational diabetes and the
foetus’s unfavourable position.
The physicians who saw her on the day of her
ultrasound found the results concerning and advised
that she report to the hospital for surgery. Epsteen
did not have anyone to take care of her two-year-
old and had the family’s single vehicle with her, so
she opted to wait to have the surgery a few days later
as planned. The following morning, she woke to ﬁnd
an email from her obstetrician instructing her to
report for immediate surgery, adding
“I would hate to move to the most extreme option,
which is having law enforcement pick you up at
your home and bring you in, but you are leaving
the providers of [the hospital] no choice.”
Fearful that she was going to be arrested, sepa-
rated from her children, and forced into unwanted
surgery, Epsteen went into hiding. She contacted
National Advocates for Pregnant Women, which
consulted with the hospital’s attorneys. Hospital
counsel eventually agreed that the threats were
legally unjustiﬁable, and Epsteen gave birth to a
healthy baby on the previously agreed-upon date
with no legal action taken.11
Threats of child apprehension
In June 2010, Michelle Mitchell presented in active
labour to a hospital in Augusta County, Virginia.12
Mitchell had recently left the obstetrical practice
where she had been a patient because of pressure
to have an induction of labour due to a suspected
large baby. Although an induction or caesarean
had been recommended, she was never told that
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an unmedicated vaginal delivery, Mitchell took
childbirth classes, joined groups advocating nat-
ural birth, and hired a doula who is a certiﬁed pro-
fessional midwife.
When Mitchell arrived at the hospital, the phy-
sician on call recommended that she deliver via
caesarean surgery, based on her medical records.
Mitchell declined, signing a form acknowledging
that she was acting against medical advice and
waiving liability. However, according to legal
documents, the physician became more and more
insistent, shouting and swearing at Mitchell and
her doula and eventually threatening that he
would get a magistrate to issue a court order to
force her into surgery and call child protective
authorities to have her baby taken away.13 Faced
with the threat of forced surgery and loss of her
infant, Mitchell rescinded her informed refusal
and underwent surgery against her will. Despite
her eventual acquiescence to the surgery, the hos-
pital called child protective authorities, accusing
Mitchell of being unﬁt to care for her child
because of the conﬂict that arose from her deci-
sion to deliver vaginally. As a result, the hospital
denied Mitchell immediate access to her newborn
and refused to release the infant to her care, and
she had to undergo three months of intrusive
interviews and home observations by child welfare
authorities before the investigation was dismissed
as baseless.
Mitchell later ﬁled suit for battery, alleging
the consent for the surgery was obtained under
duress and was therefore invalid. Her case sur-
vived numerous motions over more than four
years of litigation. But when it ﬁnally went to
trial, it took the jury less than 20 minutes to
return a verdict in favour of the physician.14
One witness to the proceedings, a nurse who
had worked with the defendant, told media
that she felt the defendant “made the best
choice for [Mitchell] and her baby.” Mitchell
has since ﬁled an appeal, which will – in the
best case – lead to a retrial in the same
jurisdiction.
The nurse’s comment illuminates the jury’s
likely reasoning, and one of the major shortcom-
ings of tort litigation as a tool for ending obstetric
violence. Namely, juries are susceptible to the very
biases that lead to obstetric violence in the ﬁrst
place. Despite the best efforts of attorneys and
advocates in these cases, there is a persistent
belief that physicians, instead of pregnant women,are the ones vested with the decision-making
authority, thereby justifying threat and coercion.Profound injuries and piecemeal justice
All of the women described above suffered
extreme incursions into their personal and repro-
ductive autonomy and sense of security. They left
the experience of birth feeling betrayed and frigh-
tened in addition to the physical challenge of
giving birth (whether vaginally or surgically). Many
of them experienced trauma that required therapy
or changed the course of their reproductive lives. This
is consistent with research by Ballard and others15
suggesting that even in high-resource settings, child-
birth can be “an excruciating and terrifying experi-
ence.” Beck et al16 have found that degrading
treatment and loss of dignity and control during birth
can contribute to birth trauma and even postpartum
post-traumatic stress disorder.
But despite the gravity of the injuries suffered,
justice is elusive for many American women who
experience obstetric violence. According to the
common law of tort in most jurisdictions, anyone
subjected to unconsented touching may sue for
battery, even if that touching is for medical pur-
poses.17 No law abridges this right for pregnant
women. Even so, having a theoretical cause of
action is not justice, and many women who have
endured serious mistreatment ﬁnd themselves
barred from the courthouse door.
The ﬁrst hurdle is even ﬁnding an attorney who
will take their case. Funding a legal defence is extra-
ordinarily expensive and beyond the means of most
women. And as Abrams18 explains, absent an injury
to the baby or an extraordinary injury to the mother
(beyond an unwanted or even unconsented medical
invasion), the monetary value ascribed to harm to
women during birth is low – or non-existent in the
case of psychic injury – providing little incentive for
attorneys from taking cases on a contingent fee basis.
This may be so even when the violation is clear, as
was the case for Kimberly Turbin, a California mother
who captured an unconsented episiotomy on video
and still had to consult nearly 80 attorneys and
crowdsource a pro se legal defence fund to ﬁle on
her own before ﬁnding an attorney who would
pursue the case.19
Even women who manage to ﬁnd an attorney
may ﬁnd that their case is time-barred or subject to
unpredictable statutes of limitations. For instance,
Rinat Dray struggled to ﬁnd an attorney who would
pursue her extraordinarily well-documented case of59
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attorney after the one-year statute of limitations for
battery had expired. She was therefore left litigating
the case as a malpractice and negligence suit, and
the court has dismissed some of her claims on the
basis that they amount to battery rather than mal-
practice. Other women have been told the opposite
– that their allegations of abusive and unconsented
interventions are malpractice instead of battery. The
one predictable factor is that the correct cause of
action usually seems to be the one that is time-
barred, foreclosing litigation as an option.Systemic failures with politicized roots
The most troubling aspect of leaving the adjudica-
tion of obstetric violence to the civil justice system
is that it treats the matter as either a medical error
or an interpersonal conﬂict similar to a ﬁstﬁght on
a street corner.§ The problem is signiﬁcantly more
complicated. One aspect is the perceived liability
risk for harm to a foetus. This perception of risk,
while usually signiﬁcantly overestimated, leads
practitioners to pressure or coerce women out of
fear of malpractice liability,18 and institutions to
implement policies that restrict women’s choices
about delivery.21 This, when combined with the
low value ascribed to injury or failure of informed
consent for the pregnant woman, results in per-
verse incentives. These are evident in the fact that
the threats against Goodall were authored by the
hospital’s chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer, and Dray’s forced
surgery was approved by the hospital’s risk man-
agement counsel. But the perverse incentives are
not the entire picture – obstetric violence is more
than the aggregation of individual cost-beneﬁt
analyses. Rather, the lack of monetary value
ascribed to birthing women’s dignity is a symptom
of pernicious beliefs about women’s autonomy
that have an independent, direct effect on interac-
tions between providers and patients.§There is one known exception – Catherine Skol ﬁled suit for
gross negligence and negligent emotional distress after being
abused by a physician who refused her an epidural, made her
lay in an excruciating position for hours, told her to “shut up
and push”, when she protested, sewed an episiotomy with an
inappropriately large needle, and told her that “pain was the
best teacher” for her failure to notify the physician that she
was coming to the hospital. She was awarded $1.4 million by
a jury, the highest Illinois verdict for negligent/intentional inﬂic-
tion of emotional distress in a medical malpractice case.20
60Oberman22 theorizes that the overmastering of a
birthing woman’s will is a breach of a ﬁduciary duty,
(given the imbalance of information and power
between the physician and the patient) driven by
“divided loyalties” when physicians rationalize the
foetus as a “second patient”. This is certainly so, but
a survey conducted by Samuels et al23 also points to
underlying beliefs about women’s reproductive
autonomy as a signiﬁcant factor in perpetration of
obstetric violence. Samuels et al surveyed physicians
and health attorneys and found that the personal
value they ascribe to the foetus (i.e. anti-abortion or
conservative attitudes) correlated strongly with their
willingness to seek a court-ordered caesarean surgery
over the protest of an unwilling patient. The authors
concluded that this tension leaves women caught “in
proxy wars between those who place a premium on
maternal autonomy rights and those who believe
that foetal interests are more compelling.” In this
light, use of legal process to compel compliance is
revealed as a violent policing of gender norms.
Physicians who attempt to justify obstetric vio-
lence with foetal protection usurp the role of carrying
out the state’s interest in the protection of potential
life to a degree that has never been supported by US
jurisprudence. The defendants in Rinat Dray’s case
argued asmuch, saying that it was “naïve and foolish”
to suggest that pregnant patients have the same
rights as others “given the considerations the preg-
nant status invokes”.6 The defendants went so far as
to suggest that Dray should seek a legislative remedy
rather than a litigated one; that is, they asserted that
pregnancy creates ipso facto immunity for any act
deemed by the medical provider to be in the
best interest of a foetus. Calling her case “thought
provoking” and “controversial”, the defendants
claimed a duty on the part of physicians to vindicate
the state’s interest in protection of potential life, even
over the objection of a competent and unwilling
patient. To do so, they cited decisions that favour
pregnant women, including New York’s seminal cases
establishing abortion rights24 and establishing a duty
to provide competent medical care to a foetus later
born alive.25 The defendants’ assertions reveal
the gender discrimination underpinning obstetric
violence: women are guaranteed equal protection
under existing law, but health care providers, institu-
tions, and even courts are willing to “read in” excep-
tions that do not exist, perpetuating a second-class
status for women under the law.
As Charles26 argued in a controversial article, by
enforcing coercive gender norms, bullying and
court-mandated interventions share signiﬁcant
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Responses to the article were deeply divided,27
but one recurring theme was the idea that the beha-
viours described cannot be gender-based violence
because so many obstetricians are women. This
misses an important understanding: an act of
gender-based violence is not considered such
because the perpetrator is a man, but rather because
the victim is a woman. This explains research from
around the world in which women were found to
be abused by men and women in the birth setting.28
Some of this unethical behaviour is likely related
to the fact that the law has failed to directly rectify
the lingering controversy among practitioners as to
the appropriateness of overriding the decisions of
pregnant patients in all jurisdictions. The ACOG Com-
mittee on Ethics is clear and directive in its opinion
that forced surgeries and litigation over medical
interventions are virtually never ethically justiﬁ-
able.29 And in spite of some aberrations in trial
courts, modern case law rejects the notion that
pregnant women have any lesser entitlement to the
fundamental rights to bodily autonomy than any
other person under the Constitution.30–32 But these
rights do not always translate into remedies: extreme
outliers exist both in practice and in academia.33
The extent to which these outliers are held to
account for their violation of women’s common
law and human rights beyond the civil justice system
is unknown, but is likely quite limited. The ACOG
Ethics Committee opinion is not legally binding –
and was in fact excluded from evidence in Michelle
Mitchell’s case. One physician, who was sued for
threatening a New Jersey mother with child appre-
hension and a court-mandated caesarean until she
capitulated to surgery, openly admitted in a deposi-
tion that she disagreed with the notions that
informed consent is necessary and that a pregnant
woman is the ultimate decision maker about her
healthcare. As she explained:
“She certainly can refuse the C-section, that is not
the problem. I respect patient’s opinion. …[But] I
have two patients. I don’t have just one patient …
that is why I disagree with the statement of your, of
the American, whatever, ACOG, that the desire of
the mother has to supersede the desire of the fetus.
I disagree with that. … I have an obligation now
toward the baby. I’ve gotta speak for the baby
because that is my second patient.”34
The gender bias underpinning the use of threats
and coercion to enforce medical advice is not subtle.It is axiomatic that a person of soundmind cannot be
forced to undergo amedical procedure (such as a kid-
ney transplant). This principle applies even if the pro-
cedure would save the life of another person and
even if that other person were their child. Pregnant
women, however, are expected to sacriﬁce their
health and dignity, and even potentially their lives,
in the name of having a healthy baby.Alternatives in foreign law
The problems described throughout this article are
not unique to the United States. Just last year, the
World Health Organization (WHO)35 issued a state-
ment on the prevention and elimination of disre-
spect and abuse during facility-based childbirth.
Calling the phenomenon “an important public
health and human rights issue”, the WHO urged gov-
ernments and development partners to research,
recognize, and redress disrespectful and abusive
maternity care. Moreover, the United Nations Spe-
cial Rapporteur on health36 and the Special Rappor-
teur on cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment37
have expressed concerns about mistreatment of
pregnant women seeking reproductive health care
as causing unnecessary suffering on the basis of
gender. As Erdman notes,38 the growing attention to
childbirth in maternal rights advocacy has created
opportunities to highlight institutional injustices
and social inequities, and call for broader reform.
Latin America, where many countries have rela-
tively newer, human rights-based constitutions and
bodies of law, has taken the lead in creating legal
structures addressing this issue. Venezuela was
one of the ﬁrst jurisdictions to create a statutory
right of action recognizing obstetric violence.39 Spe-
ciﬁcally, it is recognized as a form of gender-based
violence as a part of the Organic Law on the Right of
Women to a Life Free of Violence. The law deﬁnes
obstetric violence as:
“...the appropriation of the body and reproductive
processes of women by health personnel, which is
expressed as dehumanized treatment, an abuse of
medication, and to convert the natural processes
into pathological ones, bringing with it loss of
autonomy and the ability to decide freely about
their bodies and sexuality, negatively impacting
the quality of life of women.”
A number of examples are provided, including
inattention to obstetric emergencies, birth in the
lithotomy position, needless separation of mother61
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delivery without consent. The penalty for commis-
sion of obstetric violence is a ﬁne of 250 to 500 tax
units – the equivalent of $5,000 to $10,000 – and
professional disciplinary proceedings. Argentina
and ten Mexican states also recognize obstetric vio-
lence as a form of violence against women; the states
of Chiapas, Guerrero, and Veracruz even impose
criminal penalties on offenders. These laws provide
a range of remedies, including administrative
complaints, specialized medical arbitration, and
complaints before federal and state human rights
commissions.
It is critical to recognize that implementation of
these laws has been beset by challenges, and women
face signiﬁcant barriers to justice because of lax
enforcement, lack of rights-based training among
health care providers, and failure to address infra-
structural weaknesses.40–41 For instance, Herrera42
demonstrates that, in Argentina, despite the passage
of a 2004 statute guaranteeing the rights of birthing
women and a 2009 statute prohibiting obstetric vio-
lence, courts adjudicating tort suits continue to rely
on a malpractice analysis rather than the norms of
humanized childbirth and freedom from violence.
In Mexico, Grupo de Información en Reproducción
Elegida (GIRE)43 has observed that authorities are
reticent to criminally charge physicians, so there has
never been a successful prosecution for obstetric vio-
lence. Moreover, the group points out that adminis-
trative complaints and medical arbitration focus on
the acts of individual medical personnel, but not
institutions as a whole.
Even so, the articulation of obstetric violence in
law – speciﬁcally within the ambit of women’s
human rights to health, equality, and freedom from
violence – shows an understanding of the causes and
consequences of abuses in childbirth that far exceeds
that in US jurisprudence. Notably, complaints to
Mexican state-based human rights commissions
have recently yielded positive results, including resti-
tution for women and agreements by the state to
improve infrastructure and disseminate maternity
care standards.43 The work of eliminating gender-
based violence in childbirth is far from complete,
but legal frameworks that invoke state and institu-
tional responsibility for ensuring respectful care in
birth are promising.Recommendations
The primary tool at the disposal of the US patient
for creating change in the health care setting is tort62litigation. With respect to obstetric violence, this
tool can be sharpened through legislative changes,
including lengthening of statutes of limitations,
delineating causes of action, and assigning puni-
tive damages.
But even if all this came to pass, given the
barriers to justice women face in a system that
does not yet acknowledge obstetric violence, it is
unlikely that abusive and disrespectful treatment
in labour will be signiﬁcantly changed by indivi-
dual civil litigation in the near term. Obstetric
violence is a systemic problem and therefore calls
for systemic solutions. The Latin American model
of inclusion of obstetric violence in bodies of
law addressing gender-based violence is instruc-
tive. As research from these jurisdictions shows,
imposition of penalties creates only limited
change without preventative interventions to
address attitudes that give rise to obstetric
violence in the ﬁrst place, promulgation of
protocols for respectful care, and state account-
ability for prevention and redress for obstetric
violence.
In spite of the general lack of redress for
human rights violations by non-state actors in
the US, federal policy regarding gender-based vio-
lence (speciﬁcally the Violence Against Women Act)
provides a model for addressing the root causes
of obstetric violence. Incorporation of obstetric vio-
lence into these existing frameworks would provide
opportunities for funding of research and investiga-
tory bodies, victim restitution mechanisms, and
funding rights-based education on respectful mater-
nity care and prevention of mistreatment during
childbirth for both patients and providers. One
such model for local, facility-based intervention
is that undertaken by the White Ribbon Alliance
and others worldwide.44,45 Additionally, some
measure of state accountability could be instituted
through development of concrete standards and
benchmarks for respectful maternity care stan-
dards that can be attached to federal funding
(e.g. the Maternal and Child Health Services Block
Grant).
Individual tort litigation is necessary, but
not sufﬁcient, to the task of ending obstetric
violence. True transformation will also require
provider education and greater connection
between health infrastructure and civil society
advocacy to address harmful gender norms.
But the ﬁrst step is to surface and name a pro-
blem toward which US law has largely turned a
blind eye.
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Ces dernières années, un problème que beaucoup
d’institutions et prestataires de santé des États-Unis
réfutent a attiré une attention publique croissante:
les actes de maltraitance et coercition des femmes
enceintes pendant l’accouchement de la part
du personnel sanitaire, connus sous le nom de
violence obstétricale. Par une série d’études de cas
réels, cet article fournit la perspective d’un juriste
sur un problème systémique de violence sexiste
institutionnalisée avec pour l’heure uniquement
des voies individuelles pour obtenir réparation. Il
donne un aperçu des limitations du système de droit
civil pour traiter la violence obstétricale et compare les
options dans les juridictions latino-américaines.
Enﬁn, l’article propose des solutions pour le
système juridique et les systèmes de soins de
santé.Resumen
En los últimos años, el público ha prestado cada
vez más atención a un problema negado por
muchas instituciones y profesionales de salud en
Estados Unidos: el acoso y la coacción de mujeres
embarazadas durante el parto por personal de
salud, conocido como violencia obstétrica. Por
medio de una serie de casos reales, este artículo
expone la perspectiva de un abogado respecto al
problema sistémico de la violencia de género
institucionalizada, con solo vías individuales
para rectiﬁcación en la actualidad. Ofrece una
visión general de las limitaciones del sistema de
justicia civil para abordar la violencia obstétrica
y compara las alternativas de jurisdicciones
latinoamericanas. Por último, el artículo sugiere
soluciones para el sistema jurídico y los sistemas
de salud.
